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Abstract: 
This papers reviews the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 and the regime it 
establishes. Although this regime works well most of the time, there are four key areas that 
need addressing. Incidents such as the 2013 Seddon earthquakes have highlighted the 
uncertainty around the definitional threshold of an emergency and requirements for a state of 
emergency. Further, the powers of emergency management actors are not clear. The paper also 
explores the actual and potential obligations and liability of the private sector. Five 
recommendations are ultimately made to address these issues. 
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  Introduction 
The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act), and related 
instruments, work to create effective preparations for and responses to emergency 
situations in New Zealand. The CDEM Act defines what an emergency is,1 and outlines 
the ability to declare states of emergency.2 Following such declarations, a variety of 
statutory powers are available to various actors, including the Police, Fire Service, 
Defence Force and Civil Defence personnel.3 Thus, despite the high likelihood and 
prevalence of natural disasters in New Zealand, there is a low mortality rate and a high 
level of government response. The issue in the regime is whether the public’s, and the 
private sector’s, expectations align with what actions Civil Defence and other actors take 
in reality. The Seddon earthquakes in 2013 caused confusion, particularly in the private 
sector, around the Civil Defence response to smaller-scale incidents. This paper seeks to 
clarify some of the issues in the CDEM Act regarding such incidents; whether they are 
classed as emergencies, whether states of emergencies can be declared, and the powers 
of emergency service actors. Finally, this paper explores whether the private sector 
should be more involved in Civil Defence, either through dialogue or statutory 
obligations. 
 
 Setting the Scene 
Civil defence emergency management inhabits an integral place in New Zealand society. 
New Zealand’s unique geographical position between two tectonic plates, and the 
temperate climate, place it at a constant risk of natural disaster.4 As such, the likelihood 
of an emergency situation in New Zealand, and in particular Wellington, is high. 
Emergency situations in the Wellington region will also be exacerbated due to vulnerable 
transport links, the risk of multiple hazards (e.g. earthquake causing tsunami and 
landslides), a high number of commuters causing varying population densities and severe 
income disparities meaning lower socio-economic groupings are less likely to be 
prepared for emergencies.5 The country, and individual regions, need to have competent 
plans of action to decrease damage and the likelihood of panic and confusion during any 
emergency situation.  
                                                 
1 Section 4, definition of ‘emergency’. 
2 Part 4. 
3 Part 5. 
4 Wellington Region Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan 2013–2018 (1 July 2013) at 8. 
5 Ibid. 
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Clear knowledge of actors’ relevant powers and responsibilities will allow better 
responses and emergency management. Finally there are the policy considerations of 
balancing risk management and safety in emergency situations against the need to 
continue to foster economic and social activities. 
 
There is ambiguity regarding the civil defence powers and responsibilities (if any) of 
private sector employers. This was highlighted by the recent series of earthquakes which 
hit Seddon, 55 kilometres south of Wellington, in July 2013. This caused wide-spread 
damage across the region and rattled the nerves of the capital’s inhabitants.6 Victoria 
University of Wellington suffered damage, particularly to its Law School, housed in the 
historic government buildings.7 Although this earthquake was of a similar magnitude to 
the hugely damaging 2011 Christchurch earthquake, it did not result in a declaration of a 
state of emergency. The reasons for this will be examined below, but key considerations 
were that the coordinative and special powers of the CDEM Act were not necessary to 
respond to the Wellington earthquakes. Without such a declaration, it remained 
ambiguous as to which powers were legally authorised.  
 
These circumstances highlighted some grey areas that exist in our civil defence 
emergency management regime. This paper seeks to explore and clarify these grey areas, 
as well as comment upon possible changes which would provide further support to actors 
involved in any emergency, to the private sector and to the general public. 
The primary concerns for this paper are: 
1. At what threshold does an incident become an emergency? 
2. How is the decision to declare a state of emergency made in practice? 
3. What powers are available to emergency responders both with and without a 
declaration of a state of national or local emergency?  
4. Should the private sector be further involved in civil defence emergency 
management, and if so, what obligations and liabilities would they have? 
  
                                                 
6 Rebecca Quilliam “Wellington earthquake: 35 buildings damaged in CBD” The New Zealand Herald (online ed,  
  Auckland, 2 July 2013). 
7 Jo Moir “Lecturers to cut law students some slack” The Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 24 July 2013). 
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These issues must be clarified, as confusion and uncertainty about what is the correct 
action could cause an illegal act or omission. This could lead to, or exacerbate, adverse 
outcomes of an emergency incident. Such ambiguity opens up emergency management 
actors and others to legal liability. If emergency services or Civil Defence acted with 
powers they thought were available to them, but which were in fact not available, then 
their actions could be judicially reviewable. Protection against individual liability for loss 
or damage under the CDEM Act only extends to the use of authorised powers. Any ultra 
vires action which results in damage to people or property could be open for suit. 
 
The chief piece of legislation in this area is the Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Act 2002. This replaced and repealed the earlier act of 1983.8 The CDEM Act 
comprehensively sets out definitions, powers and limitations for civil defence emergency 
management. Civil defence emergency management involves a coordinated response to 
extraordinary circumstances. There is a requirement that each region have a Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Group (CDEM Group).9 These groups allow 
coordination of planning and responses to civil defence emergency between key 
stakeholders, such as local authorities, Police, Fire Service, ambulance providers, urban 
search and rescue, Civil Defence personnel and the Defence Force.  Each CDEM Group 
must submit an emergency management plan.10 The Wellington Region Emergency 
Management team is based in Thorndon, Wellington. It is one of six Emergency 
Operations Centres in the region.11 CDEM Regional Groups are monitored by the 
Director of Civil Defence, who reports to the Minister of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management,12 currently Nikki Kaye.13 
 
 Defining an Emergency 
All incidents, from daily occurrences to what we would colloquially call ‘emergencies’, 
through to declared states of emergencies, fall somewhere upon the spectrum below. 
                                                 
8 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 3. 
9 Section 12. 
10 Section 17. 
11 Interview with Bruce Pepperell, Wellington Region Emergency Management Regional Manager (Rebekah Gerry,    
    31 July 2014). 
12 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 8. 
13 Beehive “Ministerial List for Announcement” (press release, 22 January 2013). 
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Figure 1 - Incident Spectrum 
 
The third category covers incidents that meet the definition of emergency given by the 
CDEM Act in s 4 as:14 
 
a situation that - 
(a)  is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, without 
limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, 
tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, 
technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an 
emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and 
(b)  causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers 
the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and 
(c)  cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant and co-
ordinated response under this Act. 
 
As can be seen, this is a three-part test. All elements must be met before it can be classed 
as an emergency and before a state of emergency can be declared. Multiple related pieces 
of legislation were amended under the CDEM Act, in an attempt to provide 
standardisation across New Zealand agencies.15  
 
Despite this, the Policing Act 2008, the Fire Service Act 1975 and the Defence Act 1990 
do not seem to align with this definition. In the first of these, ‘emergency’ itself is never 
specifically defined, so it is difficult to state whether it is used in a way consistent with 
                                                 
14 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 4, definition of “emergency”. 
15 Section 117. 
1) Daily Occurrence
2) Out of the ordinary events -
(colloquial emergencies)
3) Events meeting the CDEM  
Act definition of emergency
4) Local state of emergency
5) National state of emergency
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the Civil Defence definition or with colloquial definitions. In the Fire Service Act, 
although ‘emergency’ is defined in the same way as in the CDEM Act, it also includes 
specific reference to hazardous substance emergencies.16 Moreover, references to 
emergency throughout the Fire Service Act also do seem to include incidents of a lower 
threshold (a more colloquial usage of the word emergency). The Defence Act also 
contains no definition of emergency. Instead, s 9, which authorises Defence Force 
assistance to the civil power, refers to situations where “one or more persons are 
threatening to kill or seriously injure”, rather than civil defence emergencies.17 The 
discrepancies between these Acts in terms of definitions is concerning. 
Miscommunication is undesirable, given the life and death emergency situations in which 
these actors often find themselves. 
 
There are two suggested ways to resolve this issue, the first being to bring these pieces 
of legislation into line with the CDEM Act definition of an emergency. It would clarify 
the definition and create stronger communication between all actors. However, it is 
important for the Police and the Fire Service to have a colloquial definition of what an 
emergency is, rather than the civil defence definition. Their statutory roles see them 
frequently deal with events such as car accidents and house fires, as well as more serious 
incidents like severe storms, flooding and minor earthquakes. It is possible that none of 
these would meet the CDEM Act definition of emergency. Defining emergencies in this 
limited civil defence way could narrow the scope of Police and Fire Service actions, 
dangerously excluding a series of situations which are in fact dealt with by them every 
day.  
 
The alternative solution is to remove paragraph (c) from the definition of emergency in 
the CDEM Act. This would create a lower definition of emergency, including category 
2) on the incident spectrum diagram above as emergencies. It would remove problems of 
consistency between the emergency services’ Acts which do not fully comply. This 
would reduce the likelihood of miscommunication between these actors.  
 
Currently, paragraph (c) creates a subjective element which means that similar incidents 
may or may not be classed as emergencies, dependent on the capacity of local emergency 
                                                 
16 Fire Service Act 1975, s 2, definition of “emergency”. 
17 Defence Act 1990, s 9(4). 
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services. This makes it harder for national planning, as it is unclear whether a region had 
fewer emergency situations, or if it was simply better equipped. Objective understandings 
of what is and is not an emergency will allow for better records, and therefore more 
effective planning and funding. Whilst this subjectivity provides flexibility as to whether 
or not Civil Defence will become involved, this decision will happen regardless.  
 
In addition, a lower threshold for defining an emergency would better reflect ongoing 
practice and understandings. Incidents such as serious flooding, minor earthquakes or 
severe storms are out of the ordinary, and currently already dealt with by emergency 
services and Civil Defence. In practice, despite the fact that smaller-scale incidents 
sometimes do not reach the CDEM Act’s definition of emergency, Civil Defence is still 
involved. They often provide welfare and coordination support to other emergency 
services through Emergency Operations Centres.18 Removal of this element in the 
definition of ‘emergency’ under the CDEM Act would properly reflect this. Also, in these 
situations the public often has an expectation that it is Civil Defence who is handling 
them. This is partially due to the colloquial definition of emergency, which sits at this 
lower threshold. Aligning the legal and layman definitions is important, as it will often 
be a situation in which communication with the public is key in responding to the 
particular incident.  
 
Smaller-scale coordinative responses that do not rely on the special powers of the CDEM 
Act are often still needed, regardless of the capacity of emergency powers. Currently, it 
seems that Civil Defence operates in these situations, despite the fact they would not 
meet the definitional requirements of an emergency under paragraph (c). Therefore, it 
seems that common sense generally prevails in the practical actions of emergency 
management actors.  
 
As outlined above, the removal of paragraph (c) from the definition of emergency would 
reflect ongoing practice, align the definition with the layman’s understanding and reduce 
the potential negatives of subjectivity. If this were to happen, however, those limitations 
should be carried over as a necessary threshold before the declaration of a state of 
emergency can happen. This requirement limits the availability of special emergency 
                                                 
18 Above, n 11. 
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powers, and prevents ad hoc declarations of states of emergency. Such declarations can 
often have an impact upon public confidence, and local or national business and 
investment reputations.19 Excessive use of declarations could also result in a ‘boy who 
cried wolf’ scenario. Requiring the higher threshold of paragraph (c) – that the incident 
is beyond the capabilities of local emergency services or requires the coordinating powers 
of the CDEM Act – before declaring a state of emergency will prevent these negative 
outcomes.  
 
 Declaring an Emergency 
Under the CDEM Act, a declaration of a state of local or national emergency may be 
made, if an emergency has occurred or may occur.20 This must be done by the authorised 
person under pt 4 of the CDEM Act, either the mayor or Minister, by virtue of their 
positions as the people’s elected representatives.21 National states of emergency can be 
declared where:22 
 
the emergency is, or is likely to be, of such extent, magnitude, or severity that the civil defence 
emergency management necessary or desirable in respect of it is, or is likely to be, beyond the 
resources of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups whose areas may be affected by the 
emergency.  
 
The first national state of emergency occurred on 23 February 2011, in the aftermath of 
the 6.3-magnitude Christchurch earthquake. That state of emergency lasted around 10 
weeks.23 Once declared, a state of emergency is usually terminated automatically after 7 
days,24 but there is the ability to extend it.25  
 
Under the CDEM Act, whether or not to declare a state of emergency is entirely up to 
the authorised decision-maker. For states of local emergency, the only condition is that 
an emergency has occurred or may occur.26 For a national state of emergency, the 
requirements are as quoted above. In reality, regulations and guidelines, such as the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Section 68(1). 
21 Sections 66, 68–69. 
22 Section 66(1)(b). 
23 Beehive “State of national emergency expires” (press release, 2 May 2011). 
24 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 70(3).  
25 Section 71. 
26 Section 68(1). 
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National Plan for Civil Defence Emergency Management, provide further support for 
this practical assessment of whether a declaration of a state of emergency is necessary or 
desired.27 The Director’s Guidelines for the CDEM Sector states explicitly: 28 
 
The fact that an emergency exists does not necessarily warrant a declaration of a state of emergency. 
The primary consideration for declaring a state of emergency is whether the special powers provided 
by the Act under a state of emergency are required or deemed to be required to best manage the 
emergency. 
 
As well as ensuring the situation meets the three-part definition under the CDEM Act, 
these guidelines require the decision-maker to consider a range of factors before 
declaring a state of emergency. Outlined in Annex 2, they include: what evacuation 
requirements are necessary, the status of lifeline and social utilities, whether or not the 
emergency powers under pt 5 of the CDEM Act are needed, and the status of emergency 
services.29 Timing is also a consideration; earlier declarations allow more preparation 
and enable workplaces and schools to shut, ensuring fewer people will be stranded.30 
Day-time declarations also give responders a chance before darkness impairs vision. 
Finally, it must be possible to immediately notify emergency services, the media and the 
public, not just Civil Defence itself. The overall concern is whether special emergency 
powers would add value to the management of the emergency.31 
 
This process works well in practice. It is a statutory requirement to have representatives 
from each of the emergency services on the CDEM Groups.32 Consequently, there is a 
strong working relationship between all emergency services, the city council and the 
Civil Defence.33 Emergency services will suggest to the CDEM Group if they feel a 
declared state of emergency would be beneficial.34 There have been incidents where 
recommendations to declare a state of emergency from an emergency service actor were 
not heeded until much later, but outright refusal is uncommon.35 The process also works 
with a healthy dose of Kiwi pragmatism, where each actor knows and understands the 
                                                 
27 National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005. 
28 Ministry of Civil Defence Director’s Guidelines for the CDEM Sector (DGL13/12, March 2012) at 6. 
29 Ibid, at Annex 2.  
30 Ibid, at 9. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 20(1). 
33 Above, n 11. 
34 Interview with Stu Rooney, National Operations Officer of NZ Fire Service (Rebekah Gerry, 1 August 2014). 
35 Ibid. 
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limits of their own capabilities and when to suggest that a civil defence emergency should 
be declared. 
 
Examples of this decision-making process were given by the Wellington Region 
Emergency Management Office (WREMO) Regional Manager Bruce Pepperell.36 
Following the July and August 2013 Seddon earthquakes, it was decided not to declare a 
local state of emergency. The first two elements for the definition of an emergency were 
met as an earthquake had occurred that caused damage to people and property in New 
Zealand. However, it was decided that emergency services could handle the situation, 
and the special powers granted under the CDEM Act were not necessary for recovery or 
damage minimisation.37 The decision was made by the mayor as the authorised person 
under the CDEM Act, following a consultative discussion with emergency service 
stakeholders. Residents were still strongly advised against coming into work on the 
Monday morning.38 Despite having no formal powers to exclude people from the city 
centre, this announcement was sufficient to deter workers. Emergency services could and 
did manage the damage caused by those earthquakes, with the assistance of the 
Emergency Operations Centre run by Civil Defence.  
 
Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to declare is tied up in the assessment of 
whether or not special emergency powers are required. The ability to receive powers 
from other sources of legislation, such as the Fire Service Act 1975 or the Building Act 
2004, can sometimes lead to a reluctance to declare a state of emergency. Mr Pepperell 
gave an example of this pragmatism in practice. Following a significant earthquake in 
August 2013, an external lift shaft attached to the James Smith’s parking building had 
come loose and needed to be safely dismantled.39 Accordingly, residents from 
neighbouring buildings needed to be evacuated. They were reluctant to go. Instead of 
using CDEM Act powers, WREMO decided to use powers given to the City Council 
under the Building Act 2004 to require their eviction.40 The ability to use these powers 
contributed to a reluctance to declare a state of emergency, as special powers were not 
necessary.  
                                                 
36 Above, n 11. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Work to begin to demolish lift shaft following Wellington quake” One News (online ed, New Zealand, 16 August 
2013). 
40 Above, n 11. 
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The flexibility in this decision-making allows the CDEM Group to bide their time and 
assess a situation before making a decision on whether or not to declare. As mentioned 
above, while it is always open to a CDEM Group to declare a state of emergency later, 
earlier declarations allow better preparation. This must be weighed against the potential 
negative consequences of unnecessary declarations. Coordinating incidents that are 
easily managed by emergency services would strain relationships between actors and 
waste public money. 
 
Not declaring signals confidence in emergency service actors to do their job, and that the 
public should trust them to do so. Further, declaring a state of emergency can have 
negative impacts upon the region’s investment, business, tourism and public morale, and 
should not be done lightly. Smaller city councils are sometimes concerned about the cost 
that declaring a state of emergency may have.41 These factors need to be weighed up 
against any potential benefits, such as special emergency powers, or clarification of the 
situation for the public. 
 
Decisions about declarations are sometimes criticised for not being transparent. Except 
for the role of the mayor as the representative official, there is no contribution by the 
private sector or wider community to CDEM Groups. Often following an emergency, the 
public and the private sector may assume a declaration of emergency will follow. When 
it does not, there is no requirement that any statement needs to be made by the CDEM 
Group, stating that a declaration has not occurred, and the reasons why. It could be 
possible to legislate that the reasons for a declaration or non-declaration must be made 
public. To do so would give clarity and reassurance to the public that Civil Defence is 
acting, and the region has the capacity to handle this emergency without the need for 
special powers. These benefits would outweigh any potential criticism that could be 
directed at CDEM Groups. In practice, however, such communication may be difficult, 
given that communication channels may be down.  
 
                                                 
41 Above, n 34. 
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 Powers of Emergency Management Actors 
A Without a State of Emergency 
As the decision to declare a state of emergency is tied to the necessity of special 
emergency powers, it is necessary to look at these as well as the everyday powers of 
emergency management actors. The most significant actors whose everyday powers 
would be used are the Police and Fire Service. 
1 Police 
The New Zealand Police Force has relatively wide powers under its normal empowering 
legislation, the Policing Act 2008. This Act outlines the structure and role of the New 
Zealand Police Force. Importantly, section 9 outlines the functions of the Police as 
including, in paragraph (h), ‘emergency management’.42 The role of Police in emergency 
management is not further discussed in this Act. Some special powers given to Civil 
Defence by the CDEM Act are already part of Police powers. For example, even without 
a state of emergency, constables have the power to close roads to traffic if there is 
reasonable cause to believe that “danger to a member of the public exists or may 
reasonably be expected at or near that place”.43 This provision would allow the Police to 
close roads during non-declared emergencies and other incidents which do not meet the 
definition of emergency. 
 
2 Fire Service 
The Fire Service Act 1975 establishes the Fire Service and outlines their role within the 
community. For the purposes of this paper, which is largely focussed on urban responses, 
the Rural Fire Authority will not be considered. Under the Fire Service Act 1975, the 
Fire Service is granted a wide range of powers to deal with fires and other emergencies. 
Section 28 details these powers extensively. It states that in emergencies other than those 
involving a fire or hazardous substances, if it is considered that the fire brigade could 
render assistance, they “shall take whatever action is necessary to save lives and property 
in danger”.44 The wide ambit of these powers means that during a small earthquake or 
                                                 
42 Section 9(h). 
43 Policing Act, 25(1)(b). 
44 Fire Service Act, 28(3). 
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minor natural disaster, the Fire Service is expected to deal with call-outs as they would 
on a usual day. 
 
B With a Declared State of Emergency  
Once a state of emergency is declared, special emergency powers are authorised by pt 5 
of the CDEM Act. As Matthew McKillop states:45 
 
The necessity for emergency powers… lies partially in the greater need for haste during an 
emergency situation, and otherwise in the need for clearly delineated powers and sanctions to 
compel compliance with police requests. 
 
The existence of these powers under the CDEM Act allows emergency response actors, 
particularly the Police and Civil Defence, to quickly react, without the need for particular 
legislative endorsement. Not declaring a state of emergency indicates that the CDEM 
Group believes emergency services can manage the situation using their everyday 
powers. 
1 Civil Defence 
Almost all of the special powers available during a state of emergency are given to 
CDEM Groups. They are granted the powers to clear roads, remove or dispose of 
dangerous structures, rescue endangered people, provide first aid, emergency food 
clothing and shelter, prohibit and regulate travel in an area, provide information and take 
emergency measures to dispose of dead people and animals.46 In addition, any works 
carried out to mitigate damage are exempt from normal resource consent procedure.47 
CDEM Groups can also evacuate or break into premises if deemed ‘necessary’.48 This 
term appears to have a wholly subjective meaning. This subjectivity is positive in 
allowing for flexibility depending on the individual factors of an incident. However, it 
can lead to different interpretations, which raises the possibility that a retrospective look 
would find the action was not necessary.  
 
                                                 
45 Matthew McKillop “Emergency Powers of the New Zealand Government: Sources, Limitations, and the Canterbury  
   Earthquake” (Otago University Honours Dissertation, October 2010) at 3. 
46 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 85(1).  
47 Resource Management Act 1991, s 330B(1). 
48 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, ss 86–87. 
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There are also national and local plans that will be put into action once a state of 
emergency has been declared. Director’s Guidelines by Civil Defence provide 
supplemental information to those with statutory roles or powers. All actors follow 
procedures under the Coordinated Incident Management Strategy (CIMS), explained 
further below. 
 
2 Police 
Police gain increased powers under CDEM Act. These powers include the ability to 
require information that is reasonably necessary for civil defence emergency 
management, and the ability to seek a warrant to obtain such information from a property, 
if there is an imminent threat of emergency (except a dwelling-house).49 
 
Additional powers granted to Police officers and those in Civil Defence include the 
ability to order the evacuation of a place, or the exclusion from a place, and to close roads 
or public places, remove vehicles and to give directions.50 Some specific powers allow 
delegation from an authorised person to a member of the public.51 This is most often 
delegated to other emergency service workers, such as Fire Service and urban search and 
rescue (USAR), as well as volunteer rescue teams. The Police can direct people to stop 
activity which may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency52, and it is an 
offence if that activity is not stopped.53 They also have the ability to direct members of 
the public to take action to prevent or limit the extent of the emergency.54 However, there 
is no liability if members of the public do not do so. 
 
3 Defence Force 
The Defence Act 1990 gives the Governor-General the power to raise and maintain 
armed forces for multiple purposes, including “the provision of assistance to the civil 
power either in New Zealand or elsewhere in time of emergency”,55 and “the provision 
of any public service”.56 Once a state of emergency is declared, the Governor-General 
                                                 
49 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 78. 
50 Sections 86–89. 
51 Sections 76, 78, 86–92. 
52 Section 91(a). 
53 Section 102. 
54 Section 91(b). 
55 Section 5(e). 
56 Section 5(f). 
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may, by proclamation, declare either the territorial or reserve forces to be liable for 
continuous service for the duration of the state of emergency.57 If the Defence Force is 
called to assist the civil power, the House of Representatives must be informed as soon 
as possible58, and any authority given to the armed forces will lapse after 14 days unless 
extended. 59 
  
It is clear that the New Zealand Defence Force is an auxiliary and support force to existing 
emergency services. This is to separate the role of the military and the Police, but there is 
also recognition of the need for support during times of emergency. It should be noted 
that this point is also emphasised by s 9(2), which states the military may never be used 
during industrial dispute situations.60 
 
4 Fire Service 
During a declared state of emergency, Fire Service gains no additional powers under the 
CDEM Act, except if delegated to it by the Police or Civil Defence. Under the National 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, the Fire Service is the chief emergency 
management actor for any fire or hazardous substance emergency, as well as the main 
liaison with USAR, a critical stakeholder in emergency response management.61 Fire 
Service internal rules require the approval of the National Fire Commander before any 
USAR deployment occurs.62 
 
5 Urban Search and Rescue 
Urban Search and Rescue has no formal mandate under New Zealand legislation, despite 
the fact it plays a key role in many emergency situations both domestically and 
internationally. Emergency actors on the ground may ask for assistance. The level of 
response varies from sending a few skills-specific people, to a full-blown response team 
of around 70. Following the July 2013 earthquake, engineers were sent to help the 
Wellington City Council evaluate building standards.63 
                                                 
57 Defence Act, ss 39–40. 
58 Section 9(7). 
59 Section 9(8). 
60 Section 9(2). 
61 Above, n 27, cl 26(1). 
62 Above, n 34. 
63 “New Zealand Fire Service USAR team helping out in Wellington” (22 July 2013) New Zealand Fire Service  
    <www.fire.org.nz>. 
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It is closely affiliated with the Fire Service. However, it is not mentioned in the Fire 
Service Act 1975, largely because it has been established relatively recently. Around 
90% of the USAR members are also Fire Service members, the rest mostly being 
structural engineers.64 The Fire Service has sufficient fire-fighting capability to allow 
these USAR members to take on that role following an emergency.65 
 
New Zealand still desperately needs to include USAR into its emergency management 
planning. Although it is mentioned in the National CDEM Plan, there is no controlling 
legislation and it exists in a legal limbo as a semi-autonomous body affiliated with the 
Fire Service.66 Currently the only controls and empowerment exist through authorisation 
by the Police or a CDEM Group under the emergency powers of the CDEM Act or the 
internal rules of the Fire Service. Legislating or at least regulating the authority and 
powers of USAR would be a huge step in clarifying the role and responsibility of this 
emergency response actor. Given the increasing importance of its role, codifying its 
responsibilities in relation to other emergency management actors would aid 
communication and delegation of tasks in an emergency situation. 
 
C Coordinated Incident Management Strategy 
In New Zealand, all incidents are dealt with under the Coordinated Incident Management 
Strategy (CIMS).67 This outlines the process of first response and subsequent authority. 
The protocol is that control and authority of an incident goes to whichever agency arrives 
on the scene first. This is often the Fire Service or Police. If the incident requires 
coordination of more than one agency, the lead agency will be the one which is most 
appropriate, and authority will be passed to them from the first responder once they have 
been adequately briefed on the situation. The ‘appropriate’ agency is often a matter of 
common sense, with Police handling law and order incidents, Fire Service covering fires 
and other hazardous substances, Civil Defence in charge of natural disasters and welfare 
issues, and Ministry of Health being the lead agency for disease outbreaks.  
 
                                                 
64 Above, n 34. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Above, n 34. 
67 Above, n 27, cl 55. 
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Collaboration and cooperation between different agencies depends upon the personalities 
of the individuals involved, the perceived benefit of any such collaboration and that the 
institutions themselves permit collaboration and cooperation. Whilst there is the potential 
that individuals can have conflicting opinions, the institutions and norms established by 
CIMS in New Zealand mean that outright stalemate or egotistic disputes are unlikely. 
Explicit legislative endorsement, in the empowering acts of emergency services, for 
inter-agency cooperation also exists.68 
 
However, the Fire Service Act, s 32 states that the authority of persons in charge of a fire 
brigade must be recognised by all members of the Police, traffic officers and all other 
persons present at any fire or suspected fire or other emergency.69 On face value, the 
inclusion of ‘or other emergency’ to this section seems to conflict with CIMS procedures 
in that authority in emergency situations goes to whichever agency is best suited to deal 
with that incident. It also conflicts with academic commentary that in the majority of 
emergency incidents “police appeared to be in charge of operations throughout, partly 
because they were first on the scene and partly because no other person or group assumed 
responsibility.”70 This provision is not an accurate reflection of the current practice of 
CIMS and should be amended to better reflect the cooperative CIMS approach. The Fire 
Service Act 1975 is considered to be outdated, and in need of amendment to better 
empower and limit the Fire Service.71 Amendment of this section to better reflect current 
CIMS practices would clarify the relationship between the Fire Service and other 
emergency management actors. 
 
 Obligations and Liabilities of the Private Sector 
New Zealand is a very disaster-prone country. Civil Defence aims for earlier declarations 
of emergency, thus allowing people to be at home rather than work. However, some 
emergencies, such as earthquakes, can strike at any time. It is therefore fundamentally 
important to the protection of New Zealand people and property that not only the public 
sector is prepared for these eventualities. The private sector must be included in civil 
defence emergency management. In the 1980s, this became a focus for Civil Defence, 
                                                 
68 Policing Act, s 10. 
69 Section 32(1) (emphasis added). 
70 Lexa Hilliard “Local Government, Civil Defence and Emergency Planning: Heading for Disaster?” (1986) 49 The  
   Modern Law Review 476 at 483. 
71 Above, n 34. 
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committing to raise public awareness and the need for preparedness of private sector 
employees.72 Fast-forward 30 years, and Civil Defence is still seeking to get businesses 
on board. Resources are available to help create emergency management and business 
continuity plans. Various brochures for different stakeholders, under the marketing “It’s 
Easy: Get prepared for an emergency” provide information for steps to be taken. 
A Obligations 
Despite this, there is not enough communication between emergency management actors 
and the private sector. This was evidenced during the Seddon earthquake, where it was 
unclear if actors, such as the university, had responsibilities or obligations to provide 
emergency management responses. There are three possible ways to remedy this issue. 
1 Legislated Obligations 
One solution is to legislate civil defence obligations for the private sector. The public 
sector is legally obligated to ensure they are able to operate following an emergency, 
even if this is in a reduced capacity.73 In practice, this means the creation of emergency 
management and business continuity plans. The private sector has no such civil defence 
obligations, with the exception of those businesses classified as lifeline utilities. Those 
that supply power, water, transport hubs and communication channels have the same 
statutory obligation as the public sector.74 The reason for this obligation is to ensure 
essential public goods are still available following an emergency.  
 
While this reason is not as applicable to most private sector actors, an obligation to create 
emergency management plans can still be of benefit. Importantly, these allow businesses 
to understand the appropriate preparations for and responses to emergencies. Currently, 
the only private sector obligations relevant to emergency situations come from the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992. Crucially, employers have a duty to take all 
practicable steps to “develop procedures for dealing with emergencies that may arise 
while employees are at work”.75 There is no definition of emergency in this Act, making 
it unclear if this refers to all possible emergencies, or only those created in the workplace.  
 
                                                 
72 Minister of Civil Defence with the Assistance of the Historical Branch: Department of Internal Affairs (MoCD)  
   Civil Defence in New Zealand: A Short History (1990) at 25. 
73 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 58. 
74 Section 60. 
75 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 6(e). 
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Changing the wording of health and safety legislation to explicitly include the need to 
plan for civil defence emergencies would be prudent. People spend a large portion of the 
day at their place of work. Despite Civil Defence attempts to declare states of emergency 
before people become stranded at work, emergencies can happen at any time. There is a 
strong possibility that people will be at work when an emergency occurs. Employees 
often look to their employer as a source of authority, and this is likely to be the case in 
an emergency situation. Taking the university context as an example, students are likely 
to look to tutors and lecturers for guidance, even though Victoria University has no 
statutory authority for emergency management.76 
 
Unlike public entities, the private sector should not be obligated to function post-
emergency; they should simply need to have established plans and procedures to cope in 
the immediate aftermath. This would include evacuation plans, contact details of staff, 
and potentially plans for welfare provision. Integrating civil defence into the health and 
safety legislation ensures that all businesses are under the same obligations. In addition, 
rather than placing the burden of enforcement upon Civil Defence, it can be incorporated 
into existing health and safety inspections. Explicitly including such a responsibility 
would clarify the position of employers, allowing them to effectively plan in order to 
mitigate harm to their employees and business. Employees would benefit from increased 
risk management, and clearer instructions on emergency procedures, as well as any 
welfare concerns. These private sector obligations could also help to reduce the pressure 
on Civil Defence, as workplaces would be better prepared to manage on their own steam 
following an emergency. Civil Defence would better able to focus upon mitigating the 
emergency and treating casualties. For all stakeholders, clarity around the obligations of 
the private sector would help ensure better readiness, more effective communication and 
responses prior to, and following, an emergency, which will hopefully mitigate potential 
damage.  
 
There are negatives to such private sector obligations. Enforcement may be an issue, 
especially if it is down to Civil Defence personnel to review such plans. It could be 
difficult, especially for small businesses, to create practical and useful plans when most 
private actors have little knowledge of emergency management. Ensuring the quality of 
                                                 
76 Kelburn IMT Emergency Response Plan (Victoria University of Wellington, September 2013) at 38. 
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plans would overburden Civil Defence and detract from their other important work in 
increasing readiness across all sectors of New Zealand society. Incorporating 
enforcement into the existing role of health and safety inspectors could mitigate this. 
However, they are not trained to assess civil defence matters. In addition, it is still likely 
that each plan would be dependent on the specifics of the business, such as location, and 
therefore be hard to assess in the abstract.  
 
Further, there is no guarantee that plans of various businesses would be consistent, with 
each other or with local and national plans. There would need to be coordination of these 
plans, as the contradictions could be deadly in an emergency. For instance, Victoria 
University’s Emergency Response Plan details that in the event of an emergency at 
Pipitea Campus, staff and students should evacuate to Parliament grounds.77 Following 
the earthquakes in 2013, trolley-bus lines had fallen down across the road. These live 
lines meant it was unsafe to cross to Parliament grounds in this way. Staff and students 
were subsequently confused about where to assemble, and if it had been a larger 
earthquake, which caused a tsunami, there would have been no easy way to get to the 
assigned meeting place. 
 
2 Inclusion in Existing Infrastructure 
It could be advisable to further include the private sector in the existing civil defence 
infrastructure, such as within CDEM Groups. As can be seen, the private sector plays an 
important role in the preparation for dealing with an emergency. Including the private 
sector in creating CDEM Group plans enables more practical and effective 
implementation, as there has been input from the businesses and people who will be 
dealing with an emergency in their own workplaces. Excluding the private sector as a 
stakeholder in CDEM Groups weakens vital communication channels and relationships. 
Just as the relationship between emergency services is regularly maintained via CDEM 
Groups, so could the relationship with the private sector. Examples could include 
inclusion of a representative from the Chamber of Commerce, industry groupings or large 
employers such as the universities. 
 
                                                 
77 Ibid at 19. 
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However, it is unlikely that the inclusion of the private sector in CDEM would do much 
more than add a business perspective to CDEM Group Plans, and improve 
communication lines. The inclusion of city council members is adequate to provide this 
perspective, as elected representatives of the wider public. Further, including the private 
sector in CDEM Groups runs the risk that discussions around whether or not to declare 
an emergency would be overly influenced by motives around profitability, rather than 
public safety. Such inclusion of the private sector in CDEM Groups would therefore be 
undesirable. 
 
3 No Change 
The final option is to leave things as they are. As the saying goes, ‘don’t fix it if it isn’t 
broken’. This approach assumes that the current health and safety legislation is 
interpreted as not requiring emergency management plans, meaning employers do not 
have any obligation to provide instructions or advice on what to do following an 
emergency. Actions taken during an emergency are then up to each individual, while still 
needing to comply with orders given by emergency management actors. These could 
include instructions by Police and Civil Defence personnel to evacuate areas78, and it 
would be an offence not to comply unless there were not “reasonable grounds for 
believing that in all the circumstances of the case [it is] necessary for the preservation of 
human life”.79 Under this approach, it is up the individual to use common sense, and take 
ownership for their own readiness and safety regarding emergencies. According to Civil 
Defence, individuals are expected to take responsibility for their own welfare for at least 
3-5 days.80 No further legislation is required under this approach. However, that also 
means that there is no guarantee either of increased clarification or of compliance with 
existing obligations. 
 
Of these three options, the first best addresses the current issues with private sector actors 
and the civil defence regime. As many businesses and institutions already have 
emergency response plans, obligating plans would not create a burden. Victoria 
University of Wellington is one such institution. Its Emergency Response Plan acts in 
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79 Section 99. 
80 Above, n 11. 
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coordination with the Business Continuity Plan and Risk Management Plan to create the 
university’s internal rules regarding emergency hazards and responses. The Plan is being 
expanded, following a guideline from the Tertiary Education Commission in 2012, which 
is currently not yet ratified.81 The university’s Emergency Response Plan 
comprehensively details the advised response for a variety of different emergency 
situations: flooding, severe weather, fire, earthquakes, acts of violence and pandemics.82 
Although it is not a legal requirement to have a plan, those that exist must comply with 
CDEM Group Plans, as Victoria’s does. However, while staff should undertake the best 
efforts to help students, legislative obligations need to reflect that imposing liability for 
reasonable actions or omissions taken during emergencies could be unjust.  
 
B Liability 
With existing or potential future civil defence obligations for employers comes the 
question of liability. Currently, it is an offence for anyone to “intentionally [fail] to 
comply with a requirement in a civil defence emergency management plan.”83  
 
If the private sector is given similar obligations to the public sector, logic demands that 
they should face similar levels of liability. For the public sector, individuals empowered 
by the CDEM Act could be liable to judicial review as they have powers and make 
decisions under a statutory grant of power. 84 In order to prevent liability, s 100 of the 
CDEM Act explicitly states:85 
 
(1) Except as provided in sections 107 to 10986, there is no cause of action against the Crown, 
or a Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, or an officer or employee or member of any of 
them, or against any other person, to recover damages for any loss or damage that is due directly or 
indirectly to a state of emergency. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether the loss or damage is caused by any person taking any 
action or failing to take any action, so long as the act or omission occurred in the exercise or 
performance of his or her functions, duties, or powers under this Act. 
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82 Above, n 76, at 8. 
83 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act, s 95. 
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(3) No person is exempted from liability under subsection (1) for any act or omission to act 
that constitutes bad faith or gross negligence on the part of that person. 
 
As shown by the added emphasis, this prevents a cause of action against any person, so 
long as it relates to functions, duties or powers under the CDEM Act. Except in the event 
of bad faith or gross negligence, this protects all those empowered by the CDEM Act. 
This would include private sector actors and individuals who were acting following 
authorisation from the Police or a CDEM Group. For example, if a member of the Police 
or CDEM Group considered it necessary to evacuate Victoria University, they could 
authorise university staff to carry out that evacuation.87 Presuming that Police and Civil 
Defence staff are acting legally, all instructions and authorisation given and then carried 
out by other persons would fall under s 100, and thus be excluded from liability. 
 
The question is – are those taking action, not based upon the CDEM Act given the same 
protection? Sub-section (2) explicitly limits the exemption from liability to those acting 
under the authorisation of the CDEM Act. This appears to imply that those who take 
action without authorisation may find themselves liable, but should they be? 
 
Victoria University’s Emergency Response Plan gives some indication as to what 
obligations staff are under. It currently places an onus upon lecturers and tutors during a 
fire to evacuate their class to a pre-designated areas.88 There is not the same obligation 
following an earthquake. Instead staff are told to “encourage all those who are not 
assisting with tasks to go home”.89 Is there, or should there be, liability if students are 
hurt in the process of complying with university instructions, which are not based on 
Civil Defence or Police advice? As mentioned above, Victoria University has no 
statutory power of emergency management. Although the Emergency Response Plan 
states that “individuals will need to make their own decisions regarding where they want 
to go, based on the conditions around them”, the nature of the relationship, means many 
students will listen to whatever staff tell them. 90 This means staff must be cautious in the 
advice and instructions they give out following an emergency. Further, warden staff 
members are explicitly expected to give instructions to students. Such responsibility is a 
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huge burden to place on staff, who are not paid, trained or contractually obliged to give 
instructions following an emergency. Due to the nature of their relationship with students, 
it is inevitable that they must be the ones on the ground giving advice, or risk sheer panic. 
Therefore, university management should give staff clear and concise guidelines, and 
training to help understand this responsibility.  
 
To prevent liability of university staff in these situations, legislative protection should be 
extended to cover all those who act reasonably, in the context of an emergency and with 
the information known, to prevent loss and damage. To hold individuals liable for actions 
taken in the panic of an emergency would be an injustice. Further, not protecting 
individuals may lead to situations such as those that have been seen in the United 
Kingdom. Two recent incidents there have highlighted the potential liability faced by 
individuals who are paralysed by fear of liability. In one scenario, a woman fell into a 
mineshaft. The extraction equipment regulations stated it was for emergency services 
crew only, and so her extraction was delayed and she subsequently died.91 Another 
scenario occurred when a man drowned in a three-foot lake. Emergency responders 
refused to go in due to health and safety reasons, as the water was more than ankle-deep.92 
Not extending the protection to all individuals may create an atmosphere, in institutions 
and in the minds of the public, that preventing individual liability is more important than 
saving lives. This is not the desired outcome of civil defence or health and safety 
legislation. Thus, the legislative protection given to those with powers authorised by the 
CDEM Act should also be extended to all individuals whose action or inaction is 
reasonable given the emergency circumstances. 
 
  Conclusion 
This paper has sought to clarify the CDEM Act and related legislation, particularly in the 
context of the role of the private sector. For the most part, emergency management in 
New Zealand works very well. Planning and guidelines, particularly around large-scale 
incidents, are done well. Communication between the key emergency response actors is 
strong, with CIMS ensuring that all know their appropriate roles and responsibilities. 
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There are, however, issues with this regime. The definition of ‘emergency’ is inconsistent 
between acts, and perhaps requires a lower threshold to meet common understandings. It 
is uncertain what powers are available to emergency management actors without a formal 
declaration of emergency, and in practice, declarations of emergency are linked to the 
need for special emergency powers. However, the powers of some actors are unclear, due 
to outdated or non-existent legislation. This tie between states of emergency and special 
powers sometimes discourages declarations, if the everyday powers of other actors are 
deemed to be sufficient. As a result, there is opaque communication with the wider 
community and private sector. Further, the obligations and liabilities of the wider 
community and private sector are not clear.  
 
Five recommendations are suggested to solve these issues. First, the definition of 
emergency in the CDEM Act should be lower, aligning with other emergency 
management legislation and layman understandings. Second, communication around 
declarations of states of emergencies should be clarified, with reasons given to the public 
for non-declarations. Third, legislative change is needed to confirm the CIMS practices 
that exist between emergency management actors, with particular reference to the Fire 
Service and Urban Search and Rescue. Fourth, civil defence obligations to create 
emergency management plans should be explicitly included in existing health and safety 
duties. This would be preferable to any inclusion of the private sector in existing civil 
defence infrastructure. Finally, the protection from liability granted to those authorised 
by the CDEM Act should be extended to all those who acted reasonably in the context of 
an emergency. 
 
Adopting these recommendations would go a long way in clarifying the emergency 
management regime both for the actors within it and the private sector. Clarity and 
coordination can only be desirable, and one hopes that they will go far in preventing loss 
and damage in the next emergency situation in which New Zealand finds itself. 
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